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Into the Frying Pan:
Standing and Privity under the Telecommunications Act of 1996
and Beyond
Richard A. Epstein*

Introduction
The Place of Regulation and Antitrust in Telecommunications Law
The persistent problem of monopoly has brought two different sorts of
state responses that coexist only uneasily with each other. The first of these
exemplified by the Sherman Act seeks to prevent monopolization by private
firms. The second deals with direct regulation of what is often called natural
monopolies, that is industries characterized by marginal costs below average
cost, so that a single producer is the cheapest supplier of the relevant service.1
Occasionally, efforts are made to get the best of both worlds. Just that happened
February, 1996, the United States Congress passed with great fanfare the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which was designed to “promote competition
and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services
for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”2 The Supreme Court has
placed its benediction on the transformative power of the Act,3 and its views
have been echoed by the lower courts charged with the knotty duty of construing

* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution.
1“If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm
rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of
firms in it.” Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation 1 (1999)
2Preamble to the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
3See AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
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its complex provisions.4 Thus viewed from on high, it is easy to postulate some
deep compatibility between the 1996 Act and the venerable 1890 Sherman
Antitrust Act, which itself is read as the Magna Carta for competition over
monopoly.5 The ostensible compatibility between these two regimes becomes
still more explicit through a savings clause in the Telecommunications Act states
that nothing in that statute “shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede
the applicability of any of the antitrust laws.”6
Unfortunately, this oft-repeated paean to the benefits of competition is
mischievous hype, whose shallowness is revealed by any detailed examination of
the key operative provisions of the 1996 Act. These provisions do not, because
they cannot, introduce any regime of pure competition into telecommunications.
No statute can displace or evade the central dominant truth about the entire
business: telecommunications is a network industry whose efficiency depends on
an integrated system, which allows any customer of any provider to interconnect
with any other customer of any other provider. That systemwide integration can
be achieved only in a limited number of ways, none of which resembles a pure
competitive solution of independent firms making separate quality and pricing
judgments. At the very least some level of interconnection is required, which as a
minimum requires some generalized duty to interconnect on the part of all
carriers, whether incumbents or new entrants.7
Historically, various systems of regulation have been used to restrain
monopoly power over the network. One choice is the single provider, Ma Bell,
where the “system is the solution.” This approach concedes from the get-go that
telecommunications cannot be molded into a competitive system, and then
imposes some imperfect system of rate regulation as the quid pro quo for Ma

4See, e.g. Goldwasser v. Ameritech, 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).
515 U.S.C. § 2.
6Section 601(b), Telecommunications Act, codified as 47 U.S.C. § 152 note.
7See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (General duty of Telecommunications Carriers).
2
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Bell’s end-to-end statutory monopoly. The second “solution” came with the 1982
break-up Ma Bell under the Modified Final Judgment8 with the creation of
Regional Bell Companies who enjoyed local statutory monopolies and AT &T as
one a group of potential long distance carriers. Under that regime, rate regulation
was required for each of the Regional Bells. In addition, the competitive longdistance market required state oversight and regulation over the interconnection
agreements with the LECs in order to overcome the holdout position of the LECs.
The mixed success under the MFJ, coupled with the rise of both cellular
technology and the Internet, led to the 1996 Telecommunications Act. In
addition, to the interconnection obligation set out above, the LECs (now
rechristened incumbent LECs or ILECs) were subject to two additional duties—
to provide unbundled access to key network elements, and to sell at wholesale
prices those telecommunications services that it provides to its own customers at
retail.9 To broker these agreements, the FCC and the state regulatory
commissions were given regulatory authority under sections 251 and 252 of the
1996 Act.10 Yet regulation cannot be avoided here either, for t these
interconnection rates can only be established with reference to some appropriate
rate base, either on historical or forward looking costs. The Supreme Court has
upheld that rules as falling within the scope of the FCC’s mandate, but took a
diplomatic pass on the question of whether the forward-looking total long-run
incremental cost rules are confiscatory under the takings clause.11
This overpromotion of the ends has powerful legal consequences. At its
inception, it was commonly thought that battles under the 1996 would take place
exclusively or largely in the administrative arena. In this regard, the extravagant
8See, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (AT&T II, aff’d
sub nom. Maryland v United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
947 U.S.C. 251 (c)(3) & (4).
10T.A. 47 U.S.C. § 251 & 252. As an aside, I think that the regulations, as ratified by the
Supreme Court, see AT & T., allowed the FCC to take too much power at the expense of the state
commissions.
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claims that the Act has introduced a competitive system has injected a new
player into the system: a spate of private actions against the LECs on an amalgam
of theories that rest of the combined impact of the Sherman Act and the 1996 Act.
The three most notable suits in this genre all represent important variations on
the basic theme. The first of these three suits, Goldwasser v. Ameritech,12 was a
class action brought against Ameritech by its own customers. The gist of the
action was that Ameritech used its monopoly power to delay the introduction of
rival CLECs, which thus reduced the opportunities for Ameritech’s customers to
realize the competitive gains promised under the 1996 Act. The suit rested both
on the Sherman Act and the 1996 Act, most specifically the statutory duties
contained in section 251(b), dealing with interconnections. The second of these
suits was the Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Verizon Communications,13 a class
action brought by customers of AT&T, which as a CLEC had worked out section
251 interconnection agreements with Verizon. Once the agreement was in place,
and AT&T had been signing up former Verizon customers, AT&T alleged
specific statutory violations which resulted in a consent decree under which
Verizon paid $10,000,000 to AT&T and $3,000,000 to the United States. The
complaint urged that Verizon’s dilatory tactics with AT&T resulted in economic
loss to the class of AT&T customers. The third is Covad Communications Co. v.
BellSouth.14 Unlike Goldwasser and Trinko, Covad was brought by a single firm that
was in fact a customer of BellSouth. Its complaint alleged an amalgam of
Sherman Act and Telecom violations by which BellSouth was alleged to use its
monopoly power to block Covad’s entry into the high speed DSL (Digital
Subscriber Line) market.

11535 U.S. 467, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1666–76 (2002)
12222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).
13294 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002), as amended, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 20020, reversing 123 F. Supp.2d
738 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
14299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002).
4
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There are two different lines of attack that might be advanced in order to
resist this complaint. The first of these applies to all of these cases indifferently
and reaches the conclusion, as was done in Goldwasser, that the detailed statutory
scheme under the 1996 Act imposed an extensive set of obligations to
interconnect that went above and beyond anything found under the essential
facilities doctrine in the antitrust law, under which the most that could be asked
of a current provider is that it not block the entry of a future rival. It is important
to understand that the case did not argue that there was some kind of implicit
antitrust immunity under the Telecommunications Act, which would have been
odd in light of the explicit savings clause. But it did argue that it was not possible
to transmute ipso facto any alleged breach of statutory duty into an antitrust
violation. This decision has as much application to direct parties as indirect
parties, and thus operates independently of any standing and privity rules. I
shall not deal with it further in this paper, even though I will discuss at some
length Judge Wood’s treatment of the standing issue in that case.
As should be clear from the above remarks, the second way to attack the
claims raised in Goldwasser15 and Trinko.16 but not Covad involves the question of
whether the individual plaintiffs have standing to maintain their antitrust claims,
which in at least some cases turns on the further question of whether they are in
privity with the defendants. In this short paper I wish examine these procedural
issues in as they apply to the telecommunications, with special reference to
Goldwasser and Trinko. In order to see how these arguments play out in this
particular context, it is necessary to give some brief overview of how both of
these concepts do and should work it in general.

15222 F.3d at 398-399.
16306 F.3d at 98-101.
RAE: Standing and Privity
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The General Law of Standing and Privity
Standing. The idea of standing, it is now generally recognized, has both a
constitutional and a pragmatic component.17 At the constitutional level it is said
that individual plaintiffs are entitled to bring actions in federal court only if they
can show that they have “standing” to proceed. That standing requirement is not
explicit in the United States Constitution, for the language of Article III, section 2
only states that the “judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity”
that fall into the three familiar heads of diversity jurisdiction, federal question
jurisdiction, and suits involving the United States as a party. The ostensible
standing limitation is said to derive from the use of the word “case,” a term that
sensibly excludes advisory opinions which involves a suit with only one party,
but which does not in my view cover any litigation where the plaintiff wishes to
gain some legal advantage—money, injunctions, declarations, etc.—that the
defendant wishes to restrict. The current law seems to require that the plaintiff
therefore show some form of a pocketbook interest above and beyond that which
is shared by the general population. In many cases, of course, that claim is
routinely satisfied, but in an important class of cases where the plaintiff protests
against some structural injustice—the appointment of a federal bishop in
Washington D.C., the concealment of the activities of the CIA—a wrong which
may be suffered by all is said to be one for which no individual is entitled to a
remedy. In my view, these cases represent a partial repeal of the general
principle of judicial review that has been a staple of our law since Marbury v.
Madison18 insofar as it makes it impossible for the Courts to rectify government
abuses of power.
17For the general law, see, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)(noting that “generalized
grievances” are not grounds for federal jurisdiction). For a more detailed examination of my
argument here, see Richard A. Epstein, “Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and
Equitable Remedies,” 4 Chapman L. Rev. 1 (2001); for a shorter version of the argument see,
Richard A. Epstein, “Standing in Law & Equity: A Defense of Citizen and Taxpayer Suits,” 6
Green Bag 2d 17 (2002).
185 U.S. 137 (1803).
6
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In my view, the correct way to think of these cases is as suits in equity, by
analogy to derivative action where one individual citizen, like one individual
shareholder, is entitled to bring a suit to enjoin the conduct that is beyond the
power of the United States. At this point, the only standing limitations that make
sense are those which are internal to the basic logic of the rule. Just as
nonshareholders are not in a position to bring derivative actions, so too
noncitizens are not in a position to bring actions that challenge the distribution of
power among the different branches of government under the United States
Constitution. In practice, of course, that limitation is of no consequence at all. It is
difficult to think of any internal matter of governance for which shareholders or
citizens would be indifferent, but which outsiders would be prepared to
challenge.
From what has just been said, it might appear that I should be strongly
sympathetic to the view that the class members in both Goldwasser and Trinko
should have standing to bring claims under both the Sherman and the
Telecommunications Act. But that only goes to the issue of whether there is
federal jurisdiction over these cases. It bears no relationship to the question of
whether the plaintiffs in these cases have standing in the second, or prudential,
sense. To see how the prudential side of the standing doctrine works, it is best to
disentangle these cases from the context of federal courts, and to think of them as
lawsuits that are brought within a unitary legal system such as England, or
within courts of general jurisdiction in the states. Both of these are cases in which
the special language of Article III of the United States Constitution have no
relevance at all, and yet they are cases where the doctrine of standing plays an
enormously important role.
In order to see how that doctrine functions it is necessary to understand
both the uses and the limitations of the equitable standing doctrines that are
invoked in both shareholder derivative suits and citizen suits. In both these
cases, an individual shareholder and citizen is entitled to step up precisely because

RAE: Standing and Privity
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there is no single shareholder or citizen that has a distinctive interest that stands
out from all the others. The amalgamation of the individual suits under the class
action works so well because all shareholders and all citizens are in precisely the
same position when it comes to enjoining acts that are beyond the powers of the
officers (or directors) of the corporation, or the officers (or legislators) of the state.
The relief, moreover, is of necessity collective. There is no way to stop the illegal
action for one person but allow it to go forward for another. When what is
sought is a public good (or bad) allowing one to sue for the benefit of all makes
strong structural sense.
Frequently, however, that assumption of parity across large numbers of
separate individuals does not hold. Thus in the ordinary tort case, the obvious
victim is the individual who suffers physical injuries as a result of the
defendant’s action. For these purposes, it does not matter whether the harm in
question is the direct result of a trespass, or the indirect result of the creation of
some dangerous condition. Indeed it hardly matters for these purposes whether
the alleged harm is too remote to allow any recovery, or whether the cause of
action fails on the merits for other substantive reasons: the want of proof of
negligence or intention, the availability of affirmative defenses, such as
assumption of risk or contributory negligence, or even a simple factual denial of
some critical allegation in the basic complaint.

No matter which of these

eventualities comes to pass, the person who remains in the best position to press
the complaint is the person whose nose has been bloodied or whose car has been
totaled.
It would, however, be a grave mischaracterization of the factual record to
assume that only the direct victim has suffered adverse consequences from the
action in question. No man is an island onto himself, and each therefore has a full
range of familial, social and business connections with a wide range of
individuals whose own opportunities are necessarily constrained by the
plaintiff’s personal injury or property. Thus it is impossible to develop any

8
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coherent theory of proximate causation that leads to the conclusion that the wife
has not been hurt by the injury or death of her husband, even if she herself is
unscratched be the actions that maimed or killed him. The same can be said
about children as well; and so too distant relatives. Likewise, business associates
may well have to scramble to fill the void brought about by the injury or death of
one of their key employees. The relevance of these losses does not depend on the
theory of causation brought to bear on the problem. The harms here are “direct”
in the sense that there is no deliberate and willful actions of third parties, and no
natural events that sever causal connection. The harms are eminently
“foreseeable” in the sense that these causal chains are so commonplace that only
the social blind could ignore them. In many cases the putative defendant is also
the “last wrongdoer” under a now discredited theory of proximate causation that
allows the plaintiff to sue one and only one party—the last wrongdoer—in tort.19
Even though the Supreme Court couches its standing discussion in proximate
cause language20, it nonetheless takes some noncausal explanation as to why the
indirect victims of these harms are not allowed to maintain actions for their
admitted losses.
The persuasive reasons behind these social judgments are not tied to the
vagaries of federal jurisdiction but to the social objectives of any system of tort
(or as will become clear, statutory) liability. The usual point of tort is not solely to
supply compensation to injured parties, although that is surely an essential part
of the mix. It is also to secure deterrence against future repetitions of the
wrongful actions, and to accomplish both of these objectives at some
administratively acceptable cost. At this point we must take note of the common
features when these various harms are arrayed side by side. The greatest harm
comes to the person who is injured or killed. The derivative harms strike a

19For a defense of the rule, see Thomas Beven, Negligence in Law 45 (3d ed. 1908). For the
modern tests in physical injury cases, see Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 448, 449.
20Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–70 (1992)
RAE: Standing and Privity
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broader class and are smaller in extent and more easily mitigated. In some cases,
as with the injuries to spouses, that conclusion could easily be contested, which is
why the American system generally allows both husbands and wives actions for
the loss of consortium.21 But the English system, where these actions were
pioneered at common law, now takes bars suits by both husbands and wives.22
Only a small minority of states children to bring suits for loss of consortium, and
none to my knowledge extend the action to cover distant relatives, friends and
the like.23 The clear judgment in these cases is one based not on theories of
causation, but on the economic law of diminishing returns to further action. The
one prime suit against the tortfeasor is relatively easy to administer and it
promises substantial damage awards. The plethora of actions that might be
brought by family and associates are more numerous in number, are for smaller
amounts of damages, and vary in their intensity given the ability of these distant
parties to mitigate the losses in question. In a world of zero-transaction costs we
might be prepared to allow all these individuals to sue for their losses in the
name of optimal deterrence. But even that judgment is highly contestable. The
underlying system is such that the dislocations that produce losses to some
individuals also produce inadvertent gains to others. Think of the man who is
lucky enough to marry the widow; or the junior employee who gets the
opportunity to shine because his boss is no longer able to do the job. These can
never be taken into account, so that full compensation for all losses results in
systematic overdeterrence. To avoid these difficulties, the standing doctrine cuts
off the second and more removed circle of harms which it is inefficient for any
legal system to remedy. It thus produces a smaller class of tractable law suits that
do better to minimize the sum of accident, deterrence, and administrative costs in
21Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D.C. 1950).
22Administration of Justice Act, 30 & 31 Eliz. 2 § 2 (1982) (abolishing all actions for loss of
consortium).
23See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. 563 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1977) (case against) and Villareal v.
Arizona, 774 P.2d 813 (Ariz 1989) (allowing children and parents to bring the action).
10
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running the tort system.24 It also necessarily leaves a bad taste in the mouth
because it means that individuals that do suffer real harms at the hands of the
defendant do not get any form of direct relief. The price of administrative sanity
is imperfect internalization of losses through the common law system—a trade
that in general makes eminently good sense.
The need for the doctrine of standing has, paradoxically expanded, as the
legal system seeks to remedy an ever greater class of harms. One illustration will
have to suffice to make the basic point here. Environmental harms results from
the spillage of pollution. These will damage the unowned fish that swim in the
waters, and through them the fisherman who troll those waters, the processors
who package the fish and the restaurants and supermarkets that wish to sell
them to consumers in either their cooked or uncooked fashion. None of these
harms count as causally remote, yet the doctrine of standing is routinely invoked
to limit the new environmental tort to the fishermen, on the ground that the
widely dispersed individuals in these other groups can mitigate their losses by
looking, for example, to multiple sources of supply.25
Privity. Closely associated with the doctrine of standing is the doctrine of
privity.26 Here the origin of the term comes from the notion of privity of contract,
which means, roughly speaking, that the only persons who are allowed to obtain
benefits or to sustain burdens under a contract are the parties to it. Like the
standing doctrine of which it is a part, the privity doctrine is designed to cut
short the circle of individuals who can sue in the event of an ordinary breach of
contract. Thus in the usual case if Able sells goods to Baker that he plans to use in
a party, his guests are not allowed to bring suit against Able for nondelivery of
the goods which leaves them eating cold pizza on a festive occasion. The thought
here is, as a first approximation, exactly what it is in the standing cases. The
24See, generally, Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970).
25 See, e.g., Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 S. Supp. 975 (E.D. 1981).
26 For a general discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law 9–24 (1980).
RAE: Standing and Privity
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immediate action by the buyer of the goods imposes a strong incentive on the
seller to perform. The creation of a broad class of actions for all individuals who
depend on the performance of that contract adds an immense amount of
complexity to the legal system while supplying relatively little of value by way of
marginal deterrence in the operation of the system. The fear was expressed by
Judge Cardozo in a wide range of cases in which he sought to limit the scope of
voluntary undertakings. His fear was this: “every one making a promise having
the quality of a contract will be under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the
promise, but under another duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of
potential beneficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of one
relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations,
inescapably hooked together.”27 His most famous rendition of the basic point has
an eerie application to the suits that are involved in these cases, given his fear,
expressed in cases of accountant’s liability but applicable here: that of exposing a
defendant “to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
an indeterminate class.”28
The question then arises whether the principle of privity of contract
should admit any exceptions analogous to those that are invoked to allow actions
for loss of consortium. Two exceptions are important here The first of these arises
with goods which A sells to B, only to be resold to C, who then uses or consumes
them. The goods in question could be poisons or other dangerous substances,
from which B suffers no harm as an intermediate conduit, but from which C
suffers major harm. The earliest case in which C sought to recover (in tort, if it
matters) from A was Winterbottom v. Wright,29 where the defective repairs of a
coach resulted in physical injury to its driver who was not in privity with the
repairman. In his final peroration for denying the action, Chief Baron Alderson
27See Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898-899 (N.Y. 1928).
28 See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
29152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
12
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struck a chord that echoes today in Trinko if the word “antitrust” is substituted
for “tort”. “By permitting this action, we should be working this injustice, that
after the defendant had done everything to the satisfaction of his employer, and
after all matters between them had been adjusted, and all accounts settled on the
footing of their contract, we should subject them to being ripped open by this
action of tort being brought against him.”30
The implicit economic logic behind Winterbottom is to view the sequential
arrangements between the various parties as being governed by two contracts.
On this view if the driver has a grievance against his employer, he can maintain
his suit for satisfaction. Thereafter the employer can seek indemnity from the
repairman under his contract. In some cases, these two actions will each allow for
the recovery of the full level of personal injuries. But sometimes this might not
prove to be the optimal solution. The driver himself may have been to some
extent at fault in his behavior; or the two parties could have agreed (as happened
in nineteenth century England) to participate in some kind of a voluntary
workers’ compensation system that expanded the scope of coverage by
eliminating the need to prove that the carriage was defective, while limiting the
damages that could be recovered therefore. Likewise, on the upstream leg of the
relationship, the original repairman could have insisted on a complete release in
advance for damages caused by the coach, after allowing the employer to inspect
the vehicle to his own satisfaction. In principle, these more precise adjustments of
risk between the parties should outperform any legal injunction that mandates in
all cases that the injured party receive full tort damages from the repairman
regardless of what the network of contracts provided. In this regard, privity of
contract is closely allied with the principle of freedom of contract.
The privity doctrine has not, as everyone knows, held the line in product
liability cases. One disadvantage of the rule is that it always requires two actions
when sometimes a single action could set matters in order. Another is that the
30Id. at. 405.
RAE: Standing and Privity
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middleman may prove insolvent, thereby insulating the original seller from suit.
The upshot was in cases like Thomas v. Winchester,31 that in certain cases where
defective substances, e.g. poisons, in their original condition caused harm to a
third party, then that party could sue the original manufacturer, without having
to first go through the intermediate party who might well be an innocent conduit
with no knowledge of, nor control over the risks in question.
Yet even here it is vital to understand the constraint that operates in this
action. Allowing the injured plaintiff in this case implies that the middle party
drops out, so that one plaintiff is substituted in for another for the same injuries,
without any increase in the overall burden of liability associated with the sale.
Yet this formulation then raises again the freedom of contract issue. If the
defendant could have procured a limitation or release from liability from
someone with whom he is in privity, then the same limitation or release should
be allowed against the remote user. Indeed, once those limitations and releases
are allowed, then the privity requirement becomes a strictly second order issue.
The original seller will not rely on the vagaries of the law to protect itself in
dealings with remote parties. Rather, it will actively seek to place themselves in
privity with the actual users of the product, so as to impose the needed
contractual restrictions, including routinely those which prevent third-party
beneficiary actions.32 The contract between AT&T and Verizon also explicitly
disclaimed any potential third-party beneficiary liability.33 These moreover
should not be dismissed as abuses of the legal position: the downstream users
316 N.Y. 396 (1852).
32See, e.g., Stacy v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 484 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1973).
33Petition of AT&T Communications of New York, Inc. for Arbitration of an
Interconnection Agreement with New York Telephone Company, Order Approving
Interconnection Agreement, Case 96-C-0723, 1997 WL 410707 (N.Y.P.S.C. June 13, 1997),
modified in other respects, 1998 WL 671222 (N.Y.P.S.C. June 3, 1998); Section 22.3 of the
agreement, id. at *35, provides:
“22.3 No Third Party Beneficiaries - Except as may be specifically set forth in this
Agreement, this Agreement does not provide and shall not be construed to provide third

14
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have large control over product use, and in many instances will be better cost
avoiders than upstream suppliers. In one sense therefore, as the recent shrink
and clickwrap cases suggest, freedom of contract becomes the issue in cases of
sale.34 The ostensible exceptions to the privity limitation are thus testaments to
the importance of freedom of contract in this area. The critical decisions of the
early 1960s, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.35, and Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)., ushered in the modern product liability
era precisely because they rejected all efforts by the manufacturer to get into
privity with its ultimate users in order to limit the scope of liability by contract.
Just that position is ratified in Restatement 3rd, section 18, which says baldly:
“Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or other distributors,
waivers by product purchasers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral
or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against
sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to persons.” The issue of
property damage is left open.
The interaction between privity and freedom of contract took a very
different course with respect to financial losses. Recall that the original
formulation of privity makes it impossible for a third party to sue on a contract
even when both parties to the agreement have in so many words authorized that
suit. One reason for that rule paralleled the observation of Chief Baron Alderson
in Winterbottom. It would be anomalous for a third person to bring suit after the
two original parties to the contract had decided to modify or rescind their
original deal to their mutual satisfaction. But this turns out in this context to be
an incomplete answer, for the original agreement could, if it so chose, condition
the right of action by the third party on the renegotiation of the original
agreement. Or in many cases, there might be good and sufficient reasons why the
parties with any remedy, claim, liability, reimbursement, cause of action, or other
privilege.”
34 See, e.g. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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parties choose to waive this protection. In any event, the early cases of third
party beneficiary liability all involve the collection of debts by third parties that
were originally owing to the promisee.36 The logic of these cases therefore
follows the exact pattern of the early exceptions to the privity limitation. The
creation of third party liability may shift the person to whom the promisor owes
and obligation, but it does not increase the obligation so imposed. The great
concern in all these cases is that the potential liability of the promisor (or product
seller) must be funded out of the receipts of sale: that becomes a difficult task
with an infinite expansion of the scope of liability, which is why consequential
damages are routinely limited by contract. It is therefore no surprise that the
common law refuses generally to recognize third party beneficiary actions to
large classes of “incidental” beneficiaries, given the vast expansion of liability
that it entails.37 But again the problem boils down to questions of freedom of
contract: in most standard complex agreements, explicit language is introduced
to negate the possibility of any third party action in the event of contract breach.
The privity limitation is imposed by contract to bring potential liabilities in line
with potential receipts.
The few judicial efforts to go beyond this result have generally met with
stiff resistance and ultimate reversal. At point in time, there were some judicial
stirrings that persons who suffered workplace accidents could bring a tort action
against the insurer of the workers’ compensation carrier for its negligent
inspection of the premises.38 But these actions were shut down by statute.39 In
another development, buyers of individual units sought to bring tort actions for

35 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
36 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
37 Restatement (Second) of Contract, § 302.
38 Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1964).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat 1969, ch. 48, ¶ 138.5(a).
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defective construction against the lenders to the project builder.40 But again these
actions tended to wither way in the face of a general rule that economic damages
are not subject to the basic product liability rules.41
Standing and Privity in the Regulatory State
The principles of standing and privity carry over to the modern apparatus
of the regulatory state, both generally and in connection with the antitrust laws.
At this point we switch from a vaguely contractual to a highly regulatory regime,
so that the implicit movement toward freedom of contract noted above, does not
carry over. But even within this regulatory framework one point does remain
true. The systems of direct regulation and private rights of action cannot get
blood from a stone: the regulated parties are restricted in the revenues that they
can collect. There must be parallel adjustments in the charges that can be
imposed if the system is to be kept in equilibrium. That point takes on added
urgency because all telecommunications companies are sitting ducks for antitrust
actions since it is easy to allege that their (albeit diminished) statutory powers
confers on them the kind of monopoly power that the Sherman Act is meant to
counteract, notwithstanding the statutory duties of interconnection, unbundling
and resale. In light of the context, the limitations on standing and privity should
be reflected in the regulatory arena and, as a general matter they are. I shall first
review the general modern law on standing and privity and then apply that
analysis to the telecommunications context.
General Law of Standing. The leading general decision on the modern law
of standing and privity is Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,42 which
refused to allow a customer of a broker-dealer to sue the defendant for a fraud
40 Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assn, 447 P.2d 609 )Cal. 1968), limited by statute:
Calif. Civil Code. § 3434.
41See, e.g., Case Clara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 1244
(Fla. 1993).
42 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
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committed on that broker-dealer. The decision incorporated by common law
analogies a standing requirement into RICO actions, even though the basic
statutory provision did not use the term, but in so many words covered “any
person injured in his business or property.”43 The case made explicit reliance on
the antitrust precedents under Section 15 of the Clayton Act,44 which served as a
model for RICO. In this case, as well as others, the standing requirement was
unfortunately conflated with the rules of proximate causation, even though, as
noted earlier, the standing requirement develops precisely because the rules of
proximate causation are not restrictive enough with respect to indirect harms.45
All this said, the “policy justifications” behind the Supreme Court’s
standing rules are not dependent on any proximate causation arguments, and
these track perfectly the generalized arguments for the prudential standing
requirement set out above. The first of these factors note that as other events
intervene it becomes ever more difficult to determine the extent of loss that is
attributable to the actions of the defendant. Knocking out remote parties from
liability has, of course, the same effect that the privity limitation does in products
liability cases. It places the risk of loss on the parties who are in possession of the
relevant goods or in control of the relevant situation. The second concern noted
in Holmes related to the need to avoid complex rules for apportioning losses
among the multiple parties who form links in the causal chain. The last of
Holmes’s relevant considerations is that suits brought by remote victims were
43 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The complete section reads: “Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1362 of this chapter may sue therefore in any
appropriate United States district court. . . .”
44 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267-272. As we said, however, in Associated General Contractors {v.
California State Council of Carpenters]459 U.S. 519 [(1983)], quoting Justice Holmes, “‘The general
tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.’” 459 U.S. at
534 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533, (1918)), and
the reasons that supported conforming Clayton Act causation to the general tendency apply just
as readily to the present facts, underscoring the obvious congressional adoption of the Clayton
Act direct-injury limitation among the requirements of § 1964(c).”
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unnecessary when the needed incentive effects could be supplied by the parties
who were subject to immediate injury.
Antitrust. Standing Similar issues have had been important under the
general antitrust laws. The most obvious application of standing and privity
rules in antitrust is the well-known doctrine of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.46
Section 15 of the Clayton Act reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust law may sue therefore in any
district court of the United States . . . .”
On its face that provision does not distinguish between direct and indirect
victims of the defendant’s wrong, for both types of parties are indeed “injured” if
the only question at hand are the tests of proximate cause discussed above.
Nonetheless in Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court drew the distinction between
direct and indirect purchasers that is found nowhere on the face of the statute, in
parallel with the background principles of standing that have developed in tort
and contract actions at common law. The upshot was that in a horizontal price
fixing case, only the direct purchaser from the wrongful defendant has standing
under the antitrust laws, to the exclusion of its own customers who have suffered
from indirect harm.
In many of these cases, of course, the immediate buyer will be able to pass
some or all of its overcharges on to its purchasers, some of whom may well be
able to pass these overcharges further down the line. In an ideal administrative
world, each of these persons should be able to sue for the full extent of its loss.
But under Illinois Brick, two complementary deviations are made from this
implicit norm. The first permits the immediate buyer to recover for the full
amount of the overcharge, with no set offs allowed for any money it recouped on

45 See, Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-269. See also, the Second Circuit decision Laborers Local 17
Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. 191 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1999), paraphrasing, and
which contains the subheading: “Proximate Cause as an Element of Standing Under RICO.”
46 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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resale to its buyers.47 The second invokes the privity limitation to bar the remote
purchaser from maintaining any action at all against the Sherman Act
wrongdoer, even though he may have a remedy under contract against his
immediate seller. These dual adjustments cancel each other out insofar as the
price-fixer bears the full extent of the overcharge either way. The combined effect
of these rules preserves the deterrent effect while simplifying the administrative
costs of running the legal process. It follows therefore the common law rules of
standing to a “T” and makes adjustments in the measure of recovery in order to
get closer to optimal deterrence.
The Telecommunications Trinity. The question then is how this interplay of
these two provisions play out in connection with the actions brought in
Goldwasser, Trinko, and Covad. For these purposes, we can quickly put Covad to
one side because it involves a direct action by Covad against BellSouth for
wrongs that arise out of their relationship.48 That said, it is best to consider Trinko
first because it involves a suit by the actual customers of a CLEC against the
ILEC. Once that situation is understood, we can then turn to the second variation
in Goldwasser, which involves a suit by direct customers of the ILEC who are
potential customers of the CLEC.
Trinko. The key statutory provision of the Telecommunications Act is
Section 206 which provides that any common carrier who commits a wrong
“shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby,”49 The analogous
47

Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)
48 Briefly, however, I should add that I think that the case is profoundly misguided in that the
regulatory scheme alone should govern these disputes. It is quite inconceivable how a ILEC
could bargain with a CLEC if any opposition within the administrative arena sets up an antitrust
action. It is in cases like this that myth of a competitive telecommunications market upsets the
proper judgment on the interaction between antitrust and regulatory rules. The antitrust rules
should be sharply limited, as to cases where rival CLECs enter into combinations with each
other.
49 The full section reads:
In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or permit to be done, any act, matter, or
thing in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act,
matter, or thing in this chapter required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable
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provision of Section 207 in turn provides that “[a]ny person claiming to be
damaged by any common carrier” may bring suit.”50 The general phrases in both
statutes parallel those found in the Clayton Act and RICO. Nonetheless Judge
Katzmann refused to import any distinctive standing requirement into the
section, reasoning as follows:
Bell Atlantic contends that the plaintiff cannot bring suit because its
injury is wholly derivative of the injury suffered by AT&T. In the RICO
context, it is well-established that a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of its injury in order to
have standing to bring a RICO action. See Holmes v. Securities Investor
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-70, (1992); Laborers Local 17 Health and
Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1999). We
have noted that “to plead a direct injury is a key element for
establishing proximate causation. ...” Laborers Local, 191 F.3d at 235. But
we have not held that sections 206 and 207 of the Communications Act
contain a requirement of proximate cause. We need not resolve the
difficult issue of whether there is such a requirement, however, because
on this record the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that it suffered a direct
injury. In discussing the question of antitrust standing, the district court
found that “the harm that these customers are alleging—damages
resulting from poorer service than they would otherwise have received
had Bell Atlantic acted lawfully—is wholly distinct from the harm
suffered by the competitors.” Trinko, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 741. The plaintiff
alleges that it suffered a direct harm, poor phone service, as a result of
the defendant’s misconduct. While the district court may find otherwise
after discovery and a motion for summary judgment, it is too early to

to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in
consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this chapter, together with a
reasonable counsel or attorney’s fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery,
which attorney’s fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case.
47 U.S.C. § 206.
50The full section reads:
Any person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of
this chapter may either make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or
may bring suit for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be
liable under the provisions of this chapter, in any district court of the United States of
competent jurisdiction; but such person shall not have the right to pursue both such
remedies.
47 U.S.C. ß 207.
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conclude on this record that the plaintiff only suffered a wholly
derivative injury.51
This analysis misses the boat on all counts. Although Katzmann’s opinion
makes passing reference to the key decisions in Holmes and Laborers Local 17, it
honors them in the breach and not in the observance. Those cases did not allow
the plaintiff to escape the prudential standing requirement by the simple
expedient of pleading that the harms in question were direct. It required a clear
showing of that directness in light of the factors outlined in Holmes. In this case,
the chain of causation implicit in the plaintiff’s allegation was that Bell Atlantic
had engaged in wrongful conduct toward AT&T, which compromised the
quality of the service that was in turn received by the members of the Trinko
class. The three relevant considerations introduced in Holmes thus block the
action. Ignoring for the moment the class action elements in this case, it is clear
that any degradation in telephone surface that Trinko suffered could be
attributable to a minimum of three separate parties: his own defective internal
law office system, the mistakes that were made by ATT, or the improper tactics
of Bell Atlantic. It is unclear whether other parties were involved in the provision
of that phone service, although such is surely likely given the interactive
behavior of multiple parties who use the common network. Surely this counts as
a case in which the injection of independent forces makes it difficult to ascertain
the extent of the defendant’s behavior. The issue is only compounded for the
class action since each individual subscriber could make its own distinctive
contribution to the harm: nor is it clear that the interaction between ATT and Bell
Atlantic is uniform across their entire business relationships. It goes without
saying that the apportionment of causation required in this new regime will raise
the fearsome complications that led the Holmes court to invoke the standing
doctrine. And finally, ATT, which in fact pursued its remedies against Bell
Atlantic counts as exactly that sort of savvy intermediary who in asserting its
51 Trinko, 306 F.3d at 100. (footnotes omitted).
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own rights against Bell Atlantic will provide protection for its own customers.
Nothing here prevents Trinko from suing ATT if it so chooses, although in all
likelihood it will be barred by contractual limitations against consequential
damages. In the unlikely chance that such protection was not included, it is an
open question whether ATT should be able to defend itself in that action by
alleging the deficient service of Bell Atlantic. But for these purposes, the decision
on that point does not matter. If the defense is disallowed, then ATT should be
entitled to more substantial recovery against Bell Atlantic than would otherwise
be the case.
Nor is it persuasive in this context to note that Sections 206 and 207 do not
contain any explicit mention of the standing requirement. Such is true with
respect to both the Clayton Act and RICO as well. Both of those statutes
imported for good and sufficient reasons the common standing requirement into
their jurisprudence, and the same should be done here as well. Judge Katzmann
noted in passing that no one could find any case of suits by indirect purchasers
under the Communications Act before the passage of the 1996 Act, but he
thought the matter was of little importance:
To support its argument for dismissal, the defendant points to the
absence of published cases involving actions by indirect purchasers
allegedly injured by railroad rates that were regulated by the now
repealed Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”). Because “sections 206 and
207 of the Communications Act were expressly modeled on the
enforcement provisions of the ICA,” this Court has “held that decisions
construing the ICA are persuasive in establishing the meaning of the
Communications Act. ...” Conboy, 241 F.3d at 250; see also AT&T Corp. v.
Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, (1998); H.R. Rep. No. 73-1850, at 6
(1934).
Although we have found no indirect purchaser case brought under
the ICA, the defendant does not point to any authority barring such a
suit. In light of the unambiguous language of sections 206 and 207, the
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absence of such a case is insufficient to establish that such an action is
not permitted.52
On the narrow point, this decision is right only in the most disingenuous
and hyper technical sense, for the question of whether overcharges within a
regulatory system raises parallel issues to those of Illinois Brick. Does the carrier
who is able to pass these overcharges on to customers have the right to recover
them from the railroad. That issue was raised in Southern Pacific Co. v. DarnellTaenzer Lumber Co.,53 which was relied on explicitly by the Supreme Court in
both regulatory and antitrust contexts, and which was quoted with approval in
Holmes.54 In Southern Pacific, the precise question before the Supreme Court was
whether an immediate customer could recover the full amount of the overcharge
under the Interstate Commerce Act. In a literal sense, it is possible for Judge
Katzmann to say that “we have found no indirect purchaser case.” But in a
functional sense, it is clear beyond a shadow of the doubt that Justice Holmes
would have denied that action if it had been brought. Here is what he had to say:
[The indirect purchaser] has no privity with the carrier. The
carrier ought not to be allowed to retain his illegal profit, and the only
one who can take it from him is the one that alone was in relation with
him, and from whom the carrier took the sum. Behind the technical
mode of statement is the consideration well emphasized by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, of the endlessness and futility of
the effort to follow every transaction to its ultimate result. Probably in
the end the public pays the damages in most cases of compensated
torts.55
Holmes’s import is easy to collect by looking at the precedents he cites.
For example, State v. Central Vermont Ry.56 did involve an indirect purchaser who
was promptly bounced on privity grounds under a statute whose operative
provision allowed the “party aggrieved” by an overcharge to obtain recovery
52 Trinko, at 100.
53245 U.S. 531 (1918).
54See Holmes, as quoted, note 44, supra.
55Id. at 534.
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from the carrier. Nonetheless, the Court was emphatic that the common law
rules carried over to the situation. I quote the passage in full so that there can be
no mistake of its meaning.
The question here is regarding the right to sue. The right to
recover an overcharge is given to the party aggrieved. The party
aggrieved, in the natural sense, is one from whom the overcharge is
demanded and collected. Does the fact that this person refrains from
asserting his remedy, and recoups himself by an adjustment of prices
based on the charges exacted, make each one of his purchasers a party
aggrieved within the meaning of the statute? The parties thus
aggrieved have no relations with the railroad company, and suffer but
indirectly from the action of the company through the ordinary
operation of the laws of trade. This plaintiff is injuriously affected as
every member of the community is injuriously affected who purchases
an article of merchandise at an increased price because of the payment
by the dealer of an excess of freight charges. If such a payment of
freight charges in the form of purchase price entitles the payor to
recover from the railroad company, different persons, affected by the
action of the company in different ways, are entitled to sue it for the
same money. It can hardly be denied that a provision for the recovery
of an overpayment points to the parties in whose dealings the
overpayment was made, and to the payor therein as the party
aggrieved. The loss of the plaintiff flows directly from the action of its
vendor, and only indirectly from the defendant’s overcharge. It may be
substantially injured, but it cannot be brought within the remedy
without holding that the right to sue follows the transfer of the
property wherever it may be sold with the freight charges transformed
into purchase price. A statute is not to be given a construction at
variance with established rules of procedure unless the intention of the
Legislature is apparent.57
There is then a pretty solid line of cases that addresses the precise
question on which Judge Katzmann could not find any relevant authority. The
solution that it imposes anticipates that reached in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe.
The remote action is barred, and the immediate purchaser is able to recover the
overcharge that is passed on. The blithe way in which Trinko ignores Holmes and

5671 A. 193 (Vt. 1908)
57Id. at 194.
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the earlier case law illustrates one hidden pitfall to any large-scale program of
statutory reform. The 1996 Telecommunications Act did not alter one word of
either section 206 and 207, so that one should have thought the provisions had
the same meaning before and after those reforms, in light of established case law.
But instead the “unambiguous meaning” of a section is allowed to triumph over
the uniform interpretation of this provision and every analogous common law
and statutory exemplar dealing with a parallel problem.
In this regard, moreover, it hardly matters that this case differs in small
detail from Illinois Brick (or Southern Pacific) in that the consequential damages
here were independent losses and not simply a pass through of some general
overcharge. The claims for indirect losses by the health insurers of smokers in
Laborers Local 17, did not involve any pass through losses either. Yet nothing
there prevented the application of the general Holmes analysis, which should
govern to the extent that Trinko is found to lie outside the scope of Illinois Brick. It
would, for example, be utterly inconsistent with the spirit of these cases to
assume that the remote purchaser would be able to maintain an action if its
losses were greater than that of the immediate purchaser. Thus suppose that the
indirect purchaser paid a percentage mark-up to the immediate purchaser, such
that a sum in excess of the overcharge was paid by the remote purchaser. It is not
credible to think that he could maintain an action for the undefined amount of
that excess. The privity rule was categorical and its desired effect on
simplification would be gutted if the rule of Illinois Brick or Southern Pacific were
read is so limited a fashion.
Trinko then is manifestly wrong in its treatment of the standing and
privity issue. The analysis is far more difficult in dealing with the potential
customers of the ILECs that preoccupied Judge Wood in her much more
thoughtful analysis in Goldwasser, which proceeds as follows:
With these principles in mind, we turn to the question whether
the Goldwasser plaintiffs had standing under the antitrust laws to
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bring their suit. We conclude that the answer is yes, no matter which
branch of antitrust standing doctrine one considers. First, as we noted
above, the plaintiffs were direct purchasers from Ameritech, and their
complaint asserts that a variety of practices in which Ameritech has
engaged and is engaging in have led prices for those services to be
anticompetitively high, in violation of Section 2. As direct purchasers,
they have no Illinois Brick problem. As people forced to pay an alleged
monopolistic overcharge, they have described the kind of injury the
antitrust laws are designed to redress, which is to say they have
satisfied the “antitrust injury” requirement of Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, (1977). They are consumers, not
shareholders, or unions, or others whose injury is too remote to satisfy
Clayton Act § 4; thus, they have standing. . . as the term is defined in
Associated General Contractors,[ v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 539-41 (1983) (general definition of “person injured”
within the meaning of Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C § 15)58.
I have no question that this decision is correct insofar as it contends that
the plaintiffs in Goldwasser are direct purchasers as that term is used in Illinois
Brick. But if for that reason Illinois Brick does not apply, then Judge Wood should
refer to Holmes to resolve the more generalized standing question. In order to see
how Holmes plays out in the current context, it is critical to look at the substantive
allegations raised against Ameritech, which in this passage were elided to refer
to those activities “in which Ameritech has engaged and is engaging in have led
prices for those services to be anticompetitively high, in violation of Section 2.”
But that version eliminates all reference to the competitors of Ameritech that
Judge Wood noted were critical to the twenty basic allegations in Goldwasser’s
complaint. These followed the basic pattern claiming that Ameritech has not
provided to its competitors certain services that it is obligated to do under the
1996 Telecommunications Act.59 Two examples illustrate the basic theme:
(1) Ameritech is not providing the same quality of service to its competitors
as it provides to itself, in violation of § 251.

58 Id.
59Goldwasser at 222 F.3d at 394-95.
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(2) Again in violation of § 251, Ameritech has not given its competitors
nondiscriminatory access to its operational support systems, nor has it given
them access to unbundled elements of its system on terms equivalent to those
Ameritech enjoys.60
At this point it is critical to note that the chain of causation differs from
that found in the ordinary case of price fixing overcharges to the immediate
purchaser. Rather in the litany of charges raised in Goldwasser, the plaintiffs chief
objection is that they have suffered as potential customers of some unidentified
CLEC rival. Any charge that Ameritech simply used its statutory monopoly to
charge too much money is defeated by the “filed rate” doctrine, which holds that
rates approved by a regulator cannot be challenged in a damage action under the
antitrust law.61 The reason that this doctrine does not apply here is because the
complaint alleges multiple harms that Ameritech’s illegal practices have done to
its competitors, in consequence of which their telecommunications options were
circumscribed.
At this point, the case bears scant resemblance to the kinds of proof that
are needed to make out the claim of causation and direct loss under Illinois Brick.
Indeed in this case it is not clear that the direct customers of Ameritech have
suffered at all from any of the alleged misconduct toward rival suppliers. To be
sure, if each and every member of the class would have switched away from
Ameritech if it had behaved properly towards ILECs, as the plaintiffs see it
toward the nameless competitors, then one could posit a loss to them. That loss is
not simply a result of the passing down of the overcharge to a direct customer,
which was the situation in Illinois Brick. But by the same token, a competitive
telephone market allows more than one firm to keep market share. Some
unknown subgroup of Ameritech’s customers would in all likelihood have

60 Id. at 394.
61 Id. at 402. The filed rate doctrine “bars courts from re-examining the reasonableness of
rates that have been filed with regulatory commissions.” See Keogh v. Chicago, Northwestern Ry.
Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163-164 (1922), noting that the rate hearing does not protect the parties from
criminal proceedings, injunction, or forfeiture. Id. at 162–63.
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decided to stay with Ameritech, in which case they could well have benefited
from any effort that Ameritech might have made to overload the costs of running
the network on its incipient competitors. At this point, the ostensible unity of this
class of plaintiffs breaks down. It therefore becomes apparent that the proper
party to press claims against Ameritech for its alleged misconduct is some
unnamed CLEC who is the direct victim of these specified wrongs. Its losses, if
any, need not be reduced by any recoupment that it might receive from its
customer base, present or future.
At this point, it becomes critical to stress yet again that the standing
requirement, rightly understood, is not a part of any general test of proximate
causation. Rather it is designed to make sure that the single defendant who is in
the best position to press claims occupies the field to the exclusion of others. The
direct relationship between Ameritech and its customers is not the source of this
grievance. Their actions are multiple and disparate. What matters is how
Ameritech treated its CLECs. A single cause of action based on contract, breach
of regulatory duty, and, perhaps, even the antitrust laws displaces the massive
proliferation involved in this case. The point here is important because if the
general standing requirements of Holmes apply, then the precise legal theory
becomes irrelevant to the case. No matter what kind of theory is pursued,
Ameritech’s own customers would not be the right plaintiffs in any action
alleging the loss of potential advantage from contracting with CLECs even if the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 were repealed tomorrow. So long as the harm to
these customers comes through the actions that Ameritech engaged in
relationship to its prospective competitors, then it has standing and the customer
base does not.
Judge Wood also insists that the plaintiffs are not blocked from suit by the
doctrine of ius tertii. Again her words are worth quoting in full:
Finally, we think Ameritech is wrong to claim that the plaintiffs lack
standing because they are attempting to raise third-party rights--the rights
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of the competitors. It is true that the reason the plaintiffs have been
injured (allegedly, of course) implicates the rights of the competitors not
to be excluded from the local markets through anticompetitive actions of
Ameritech, but that does not make this a jus tertii case. These plaintiffs
want lower prices and more choice, and they claim that Ameritech (a
monopolist) is doing things to prevent that from happening. Their theory
is a classic exclusionary acts theory, and in all such cases, the monopolist’s
alleged sin is the exclusion of other competitors from the market. One
assumes that those other competitors are grateful for the help from the
consumer litigation, but that is incidental. The Goldwasser plaintiffs do
not care in principle which competitors enter their markets; they just want
a competitively structured local telephone market that will prevent
Ameritech from inflicting antitrust injury on them. We are satisfied that
they are asserting their own rights, and thus that they have standing.62
This argument is correct in my view insofar as it holds that the doctrine of
ius tertii is not part of this case. But the objection to the plaintiff’s standing does
not rest on that ground. Rather, the argument is that the plaintiff does not have
standing under the general rules of the subject even if the injuries to it are
distinctive from those of the CLECs. In the generalized discussion of standing
above, claims for loss of business profits through the death or injury of a key
employee are not efforts to recover a second time the losses that were sustained
to the employee. They were efforts to vindicate the separate relational interest that
the plaintiffs had on their own account. The standing requirement snuffed these
actions out because of the importance of channeling legal activity into the
individual or small group of individuals who could vindicate the policies of the
law at the lowest administrative cost. No one doubts that some customers may
have been hurt (just as some may have been helped) by Ameritech’s policies. But
the overall analysis remains the same. What is critical is not the direct
relationship that the plaintiffs have with Ameritech. Rather what matters is the
causal path set out in the complaint which runs straight through third parties
who themselves have direct rights of action Ameritech.
Conclusion
62 Id. at 398-399.
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The doctrines of standing and privity have a long and rich history as part
of the common law and as part of multiple statutory schemes. These background
understandings were always part of the antitrust and telecommunications law
before the adoption of the 1996 Act and they remain part of that understanding
afterwards. The key to understanding the Act begins with a fundamental
appreciation of its basic mode of operation. The statute did not usher in the age
of competitive markets in telecommunications. It substituted one scheme of
regulation for the one that proceeded it. That system is one that tightly limits the
charges that incumbents can make for various kinds of interconnection, and
subjects them to a variety of administrative limitations that curb their ability to
garner in monopoly profits while exposing them to serious risks of confiscation
through regulation. The potential liabilities that are imposed on the ILECs for the
discharge of their duties must come from their future revenue streams if they are
to remain in business. That simple truth has long led courts and legislatures in a
wide range of contexts to limit both the number of potential plaintiffs and the
damages that these can recover. The first of these objectives is achieved by a
combination of standing and privity rules that are designed to identify a subclass
of harmed individuals who are entitled to maintain legal actions against the
ILECs for breach of their statutory duty. Yet somehow in the confused
interaction between the Sherman Act and the 1996 Communications Act that
fundamental constraint has disappeared from view. The old fear of Judge
Cardozo was that no industry could survive the prospect of indeterminate
liability to an indeterminate class. That lesson seems to have been lost today.
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